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Introduction: The Political Dynamics
and Social Effects of Megaproject
Development
Judith Bovensiepen* and Laura S. Meitzner Yoder
This special issue examines the political context and social impacts of plans for two state-
sponsored megaprojects in Timor-Leste: the Special Zone of Social Market Economy
(ZEESM) in the Oecusse enclave, and the Tasi Mane Project stretching along the
south coast. Tracing debates about national development models in Timor-Leste back
to the Indonesian occupation and transition period to independence, this
Introduction situates these projects within contemporary debates about development.
We pay special attention to two key aspects: how megaprojects transform people’s
relations with the land, a vital source of livelihoods and cultural meaning; and how
different ethnolinguistic groups in Timor-Leste are adapting local practice to
accommodate change. We conclude by highlighting how megaprojects reﬂect and
affect aspects of life beyond economic development: governance practice, assertion of
sovereignty, sensory losses and identity, ritual adaptations and aspirations for the
future.
Keywords: Megaprojects; National Development Models; Resource Sovereignty; Land
Conﬂict; Social Change
Approaching the achievement of two decades as a sovereign nation, ordinary people
and governing leaders of Timor-Leste continue to seek to improve their lives. This
special issue explores how Timorese desires for improved lives affect the identities,
aspirations and decisions of people who live near state-supported megadevelopment
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projects that have sprung up since the country regained independence in 1999. These
projects propose to bring radical changes into existence, transforming rural subsis-
tence farmers into wage-labouring city-dwellers, who work in oil and gas, in the
service industry, or in tourism. Examining the processes of implementing these pro-
jects, we probe into public debates on development and highlight the experiences of
‘affected communities’—those who live close enough to megaprojects to experience
the projects’ effects on their own land and water, senses, social relations and daily
lives. This issue also explores the national and international inequalities and power
dynamics within which Timor-Leste’s megaprojects are embedded, and the social
transformations that are triggered by these radical infrastructural experiments.
What are the effects of the megaprojects in Timor-Leste on those affected by the
schemes? How do state visions of development intersect or conﬂict with local under-
standings of prosperity and desires to improve lives? What kind of political and social
relations are co-produced through megaproject development?
The focus of this special issue is twofold: it examines the political context and con-
testations surrounding megaproject development in Oecusse1 and the south coast; and
it examines the local impacts and responses to these projects. Megadevelopment does
not only carry impacts or outcomes upon its completion; it has effects before and
during the process of envisioning, building and beginning the policy framework and
infrastructure initiatives. As this issue shows, even the promise or prospect of mega-
projects can impact affected communities, as people anticipate and experience some
sensory changes in their environment and have expectations about future livelihoods.
With this special issue, we seek to capture some of the changes and challenges of mega-
project development in the early stages of their implementation.
Megaprojects: Timor-Leste’s Current Economic Tool of Choice
Following centuries of Portuguese colonialism (until 1975), decades of Indonesian
occupation (1975–99), and an interim period of United Nations administration
(1999–2002), the citizens of Timor-Leste form part of a self-governing nation whose
government has prioritised megaprojects and special economic zones as the primary
tool for economic development. This special issue focuses on two regions currently
being transformed by megaprojects: Timor-Leste’s south coast, and the Oecusse-
Ambeno enclave on the western side of northern Timor. Both are sites of dispropor-
tionate national investment in infrastructure development, in accord with the 2011–
2030 Strategic Development Plan (SDP) that sets forth a vision of Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) around the nation (RDTL 2011, 114–116, 154–155) (Figure 1).
The project located along the south coast, called the ‘Tasi Mane Project’, aims to
turn this thinly populated region into a large-scale petroleum infrastructure region
by 2020. Plans focus on three sites and include, amongst others, a supply base and
airport expansion in Suai, an oil reﬁnery in Betano and a Liqueﬁed Natural Gas
(LNG) plant in Beaço. The three sites are each to host administrative cities and to
be connected by a multilane highway. About one third of the highway has already
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been built by a Chinese company, costing US$20 million per two kilometres (La’o
Hamutuk 2016), and the Suai airport expansion has been completed. Construction
of the supply base, oil reﬁnery and LNG plant have not yet begun. However, land
for the projects has been identiﬁed and mapped both in Betano and Suai, and most
landowners in Suai have received monetary compensation for affected land. The
main driver behind the scheme, which could end up costing over ten billion dollars
(La’o Hamutuk 2015), is the Ministry for Petroleum and Mineral Resources, though
the national oil company TimorGap is charged with its implementation.
In 2013, a Special Zone of Social Market Economy (ZEESM) was declared in the
Oecusse enclave, with a ﬁfteen-year cost of US$4.11 billion (Meitzner Yoder 2015).
Plans in Oecusse are not designed to develop extractive industries, but use public
funds to prepare the district’s basic infrastructure to attract foreign direct investment
in as-yet-unspeciﬁed sectors. By December 2017, most of the forecast state-funded
infrastructure projects were underway in the coastal lowlands, including roads,
bridges, government buildings, airport/runway, irrigation systems, medical facilities
and a hotel. Accompanying ZEESM was the 2014 designation as a Special Administra-
tive Region (RAEOA), which has been progressively aligning the district’s governance
structure, budget and social services, and legal framework with the ZEESM vision.
We designate the arrival of the Tasi Mane project and ZEESM on the national devel-
opment horizon as ‘megaprojects’ for several reasons. First, spending on these initiat-
ives has been a substantial portion of the national budget and ﬁnanced by public
money (La’o Hamutuk 2017a, 2017b). Second, ofﬁcials’ rhetoric about the importance
of these projects makes clear that these zones are not just development anomalies, but
are meant to be core economic development models that will be replicated nationwide
Figure 1. ZEESM and Tasi Mane Project: Proposed infrastructure development in Timor-
Leste.
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(Meitzner Yoder forthcoming). Third, their effects are pervasive in the lives of prox-
imate residents, affecting local and national economies, landscapes, current and future
livelihood possibilities, aesthetic and political components of identity, labour relations
and the continuity of residential locations.
Both ZEESM and the Tasi Mane project have been infrastructure-centric, with pub-
licity materials and activities focusing largely on construction at the outset, physically
reshaping landscapes in permanent ways. For ZEESM, some legal changes to accom-
modate potential investors have also been put in place (RDTL 2014a). Signiﬁcantly,
both projects have required or anticipate using substantial tracts of land currently
claimed and used by local residents, which has been both a major source of anxiety
among residents and the driver for rapid (even hasty) implementation of modern
land management technologies. While cadastral development is occurring nationwide,
it has been prioritised and accelerated in megaproject regions, to facilitate the admin-
istrative simpliﬁcations that favour state access to land (cf. Scott 1998).
The megadevelopment projects initiated by the government are largely ﬁnanced by
the Petroleum Fund (PF) established in 2005.2 At the start of 2016, the balance of the
PF was $16.22 billion (La’o Hamutuk 2017a). In order to ﬁnance the megadevelopment
(and other) projects, the government has been withdrawing funds from the PF above
projected sustainable spending levels (La’o Hamutuk 2017b). Withdrawals from the
PF have decreased, but in return the government entered into loan agreements with
multilateral agencies and foreign governments in order to be able to continue high infra-
structure spending (La’o Hamutuk 2017b). The justiﬁcation for this was that social and
economic returns of these projectswould outweigh the costs.Heavy investment in infra-
structure is intended to boost rapid economic development, provide employment
opportunities, create social stability and make Timor-Leste economically independent
from international aid and donor money. The 2018 government programme proposes,
for example, that theTasiManeprojectwill generate 10,000direct jobs and 50,000 indir-
ect jobs (RDTL 2018). However, so far international investors have demonstrated scant
tangible interest in the megaprojects (La’o Hamutuk 2016).
National leaders have pursued megaprojects, despite strong and persistent critiques
of this development strategy from academics, international advisers, and domestic
analysts (e.g. La’o Hamutuk 2016; World Bank 2016). There has been some scholarly
attention to issues of concern in the crucial early stages of these projects’ implemen-
tation. Local consultation and participation in the planning process took little account
of local knowledge or concerns about the projects’ effects on current residents’
resource access and land-based livelihoods (Cryan 2015a; Fundasaun Mahein 2013;
Meitzner Yoder 2015). With a focus on generating national income, the projects
gave little attention to the potential for such initiatives to increase social inequalities
or to disproportionately impact socio-economically vulnerable people (Meitzner
Yoder 2016; Rose 2016).
The articles in this special issue broadly speaking conﬁrm civil society critiques
about the potentially adverse social impact of rapid large-scale development projects.
They add an ethnographic perspective on the social and political changes and
384 J. Bovensiepen and L. S. Meitzner Yoder
challenges of megaproject planning in Timor-Leste. Before outlining these in more
detail, we situate current megaprojects in public debates about development in
Timor-Leste more generally.
Public Debates on Development in Timor-Leste
The process, pace and means of socio-economic development in Timor-Leste have
long been subjects of public debate. During the brutal Indonesian occupation, dispro-
portionately high Indonesian government spending in the region for ‘visible develop-
ment’ of roads, schools, health clinics, electricity generation, and such was intended to
win over the East Timorese. Meanwhile, many Indonesians deemed the Timorese
insufﬁciently grateful for the development goodies they received from the Indonesian
government and citizenry. As Indonesia left in 1999 after a referendum set Timor-
Leste on the path to sovereignty, militias targeted much of this development infra-
structure in retaliation, burning or otherwise destroying these symbols of what sym-
bolised progress and modernity.
During the UN-administered transitional administration and in the early years of
full independence, building infrastructure for delivery of basic social services was a
primary task. High levels of engagement by civil society facilitated the recovery
process, as many communities self-organised to provide guidance and feedback on
their regions’ needs. Although ﬁnancial resources concentrated in the capital Dili,
many economic development initiatives and infrastructure investments were spread
nationwide. The 2011 national strategic development plan represented a deliberate
departure from that approach, by proposing six geographically bounded special econ-
omic zones with discrete activities and approaches for each zone (RDTL 2011, 114–
116; 154–155). The activities in these ‘strategic zones’ was to be based on comparative
advantages, and tax and customs laws exemptions were to be developed for these
regions. By early 2018, only Oecusse and the Tasi Mane region have seen concrete
activities related to their special status.
Engaging with the anthropological literature on techno-politics, Meitzner Yoder (this
special issue) analyses the political context in which ZEESM is embedded. Noting that a
focus on highly visible infrastructure projects can obscure attention to governance prac-
tices, she examines how centralising political authority intertwines both envisioning and
implementing a megadevelopment project. Despite the open party politics underlying
the creation of ZEESM alongside a special administrative unit (RAEOA), the techno-
politics operative in Oecusse work by framing economic development issues as chieﬂy
technical and therefore politically neutral. The dominance of regional planning
signals a detachment from the region’s existing resource use, ritual meaning and liveli-
hoods as land is rendered subject to technical considerations.
Setting a development agenda in Timor-Leste has been a polarised and polarising
process in the past decade. Forming a new nation entails a lot of work, from drafting
new laws to designing and implementing new structures for civil service, in addition to
recovery from destructive violence and widespread displacement. Through the UN
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Transitional Administration and in the relief-development industry of bilateral aid
and INGOs, thousands of expatriates from around the world have worked in positions
of government advisors, consultants, program staff, researchers, and other duties.
They have offered analysis, international perspectives, judgment, counsel, and
written policy for this small nation. In recent years, many Timorese leaders have
grown weary or suspicious of the accumulated volume of international intervention
and input of a changing cadre of short-term development consultants (Bovensiepen
2016; see also Bovensiepen & Nygaard-Christensen 2018). They have become increas-
ingly frustrated with foreign consultants who warn of the perils of the resource curse,
label Timor-Leste a failed state, or critique government initiatives (e.g. Pereira 2014);
they may receive warnings about the hazards of oil dependency with the feeling that
‘outsiders don’t want us to develop’ as one of our research participants suggested. As
Cryan (2015b) has noted, consultations and advocacy can also diminish over time, and
local disengagement can be exacerbated when outsiders are seen to wield dispropor-
tionate power.
The current megaprojects are themselves hybrids of East Timorese and foreign
inﬂuence. The Tasi Mane project is a prominent feature of national economic devel-
opment policy; some foreign technology and expertise is needed to bring the projects
to fruition, and they are subject to international regulations and markets. Since the
beginning, key leadership positions of ZEESM have been held almost entirely by
East Timorese, most of whom have family linkages to Oecusse. Still, many of the
project designs have been produced by foreign consultants from Asia and Portugal,
and some project advisors have been international staff with the UNDP. Nevertheless,
a unique and important feature of development megaprojects in Timor-Leste is that
they are not imposed by external lending agencies, as is sometimes the case with
large infrastructure projects (Routledge 2003). The plans for ZEESM and Tasi Mane
have not been driven by external private investors, either; rather, they are national
strategies to attract foreign direct investment to Timor-Leste, requiring up-front
public spending on infrastructure.
In their analysis of the political discourses surrounding the planning and implemen-
tation of the Tasi Mane project, Bovensiepen and Nygaard-Christensen (2018), argue
that the project is a fundamental aspect of post-conﬂict state building in Timor-Leste.
Contrasting the aspirations for prosperity associated with the project and the pertinent
civil society critiques, they highlight the politically productive dimensions of megade-
velopment. The Tasi Mane projects embody both the material and ideological pro-
cesses of state building, while also making some of the fundamental paradoxes and
contradictions of this process visible.
Public debates on development in Timor-Leste often represent Timor-Leste’s future
as a binary choice between two extremes: high-modernist development or living
‘behind the times’ as subsistence farmers. Those who deﬁne modernisation as devel-
opment caution their opponents not to idealise rural life, which is hard and does
not produce sufﬁcient livelihoods for many farmers. Many rural East Timorese, like
their urbanised leaders, desire a better standard of living with amenities that will
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improve the lives of their families and opportunities for their children; even basic ser-
vices remain unrealised in many regions. However, for most affected communities,
there is not a hierarchy of desires or values; the desire for improved lives and living
standards is not automatically associated with a loss or rejection of traditional life-
styles and subsistence techniques (Bovensiepen n.d.). However, the conﬂicting
desires of people living in Timor-Leste’s ‘strategic zones’ might lead them to accept
developmental changes without being able to fully anticipate the consequences these
changes may have for their livelihoods. This is particularly relevant with regards to
land-ownership—a highly controversial topic in Timor-Leste, that is at the centre of
debates around megaprojects.
The Matter of Land
In Land’s End, Tania Murray Li (2014) chronicles how the desire to prosper, to attain a
life with easier access to food, public services, and consumer goods led subsistence
farmers of Sulawesi, Indonesia, to individualise their own common landholdings
and to adjust the institutions governing their collective social life accordingly. In
this case, villagers undertook these measures to improve their own living conditions
on their own accord, without direct corporate or state coercion. Despite high expec-
tations of hoped-for prosperity, rural residents experienced widely divergent economic
outcomes, and communities saw the growth of economic inequalities among them-
selves. The devastation resulting from loss of land and livelihoods, for some people,
was compounded by a lack of voice or representation in the political processes that
shaped the regional context. Li’s study contains important parallels and lessons for
development megaprojects in Timor-Leste.
For largely agrarian societies, like Timor-Leste, the matters of land ownership, dis-
tribution, expropriation, collectivisation, access, claims, transactions, and the like are
critical to the lives and livelihoods of residents. Mari Alkatiri, appointed by the central
government to head ZEESM, argued that residents of the newly declared zone would
need to change their view of land, toward something having productive potential and a
resource to provide ongoing income (Rttl 2013). This is visible in concrete policies
since state-run megadevelopment state acquisition of privately held land (whether
individually or collectively owned). Projects ‘need’ this land (Gabitene do Ex Primeiru
Ministro Dr. Mari Alkatiri 2013) to be used by corporations or state agencies, to
provide some natural resource (e.g. mining, timber), or to erect structures for
imported industries, factories, power plants, or reﬁneries that require nothing from
the land other than simply space. To date, most of the proposed megaprojects
require land for space, but are not dependent on materials that consume the land.
In Tasi Mane, the oil/gas resource that is the object of megaproject development
comes from the sea (though surveys are currently being carried out to assess the econ-
omic viability of onshore resources); in Oecusse, while the nature of the SEZ’s devel-
opment visions remain undeﬁned, they presumably include some type of
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manufacturing or processing industry that requires pavement, structures, and will
divert water for its functioning.
Megaprojects require use of land in ways that are dissonant with the ways in which
agrarian communities use land for subsistence purposes. In Suai and Betano, land
affected by the Tasi Mane project includes plots commonly used for agriculture,
forested regions with valuable wood, as well as areas by the sea, which is regularly
accessed by ﬁsherfolk. They also include sites that have a ritual signiﬁcance or that
are claimed by the original inhabitants of the region (see Crespi & Guillaud, this
special issue). Affected communities will lose access to this land once the projects
are fully implemented. Just preceding the public launch of ZEESM in Oecusse in
November 2015, some coastal lands were reallocated to accommodations and food
venues for visitors (Meitzner Yoder 2016). Locals understood that their community-
used land was needed temporarily to accommodate guests coming for the project
launch events, but these new features on the landscape have not been dismantled
after the event’s conclusion.
Dozens of anthropological studies on Timor emphasise that issues of land are intri-
cately intertwined with multiple aspects of Timorese identity and social life: origin
stories are used across Timor to explain and to justify land ownership and access is
tethered to speciﬁc places (Barnes 2011; Bovensiepen 2015; McWilliam & Traube
2011; Palmer 2015; Rede ba Rai 2013); knowledge and speaking about land and
boundaries are highly guarded (Bovensiepen 2014a; Meitzner Yoder 2005); and the
health of the land and its human residents are understood to be inseparable (Rede
ba Rai 2013; Rose 2017). For these reasons, the radical and wide-spread commoditisa-
tion of land to accompany currect megaproject development is likely to have effects far
beyond matters of subsistence.
Overlapping claims to land from different historical periods have produced a com-
plicated legal situation with regards to land claims (Fitzpatrick 2002; McWilliam,
Barnes, & Fitzpatrick 2013). In 2014, the central government launched a national
cadastral program that seeks to register all claims (RDTL 2014b). The areas identiﬁed
for megaprojects are prioritised since land expropriation is a critical ﬁrst step to their
realisation. Brunna Crespi and Dominique Guillaud (this special issue) describe the
impact of land expropriation in Suai. They show how the ﬁnancial compensation
for land in Suai-Covalima has intensiﬁed or produced a number of local disputes,
many of which have their origins in disagreements caused by earlier waves of
forced resettlement during the Indonesian occupation. Since there are few ofﬁcial
land titles, and because original landowning groups agreed to give land to settlers in
the past, the disputes between different communities tend to concern rights for com-
pensation and whether original autochthonous people or current land-users should
receive these government funds.
Inter- and intra-communal disputes and compensation payments were prominent
issues during Bovensiepen’s ﬁeldwork in Suai (in 2015 and 2017) and in Betano (in
2016). As predicted by Cryan (2015b), the more vulnerable members of society were
most affected by these conﬂicts. A representative of the Suai women’s network
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interviewed argued that women often lost the security of land ownership through the
compensation process. Many of the areas affected by the Tasi Mane project in Suai and
Betano arematrilineal, and land is passed on fromparents to their daughters. Bovensiepen
observed that when compensation was provided for affected land, in many cases the son-
in-law’s name was registered for a given piece of land, and thus had the right to compen-
sation. The representative of the women’s network recounted several recent incidents in
Suai where a husband received a large sumof compensation fromhis wife’s land and sub-
sequently left his wife to take a newwife. Compensation was also paid out to brothers of a
land-owning woman, hence weakening matrilineal arrangements. In addition, the repre-
sentative of the women’s network observed that cases of domestic violence had gone up
dramatically since ﬁnancial compensation from the government for land was received.
Whilst matrilineal inheritance does not mean women have political inﬂuence or
decision-making powers, it does provide women with some additional security.
Accommodating Change
Throughout Timor-Leste’s turbulent history, many language groups managed to
accommodate radical changes and outside inﬂuences, while emphasising the continu-
ity of speciﬁc ritual and customary practices. In part, this has been possible due to the
signiﬁcance of the symbolic opposition between indigenous potency and foreign
power in many regions of the country. This binary, well-known across Southeast
Asia (e.g. Errington 1990), allows ethno-linguistic groups to integrate outside inﬂu-
ences, while subordinating them to indigenous logics (see e.g. Traube 1986). In the
period after the Indonesian occupation, the emphasis on continuity in the light of
radical change has helped people to rebuild their lives, and has enabled the renegotia-
tion of local power relations (Bovensiepen 2015; Meitzner Yoder 2007).
The tension between change and continuity is visible in Michael Rose’s contribution
to this special issue. He discusses how Meto ritual speech both reﬂects and enacts
Oecusse highland residents’ facility to incorporate novel elements (such as megapro-
jects and modern educational practices) into their existing social realities, which are
rooted in a spiritually rich landscape. But even as new elements are incorporated
into their lives, they are classiﬁed as foreign (kase), counterposed to practices which
are indigenous or familiar (meto). Indeed, Meto people in Oecussi understand that
their encounters with, and acceptance of, foreign elements are ritually mediated by
connections with ancestral spirits whose support is necessary for success and good
fortune (see also Bovensiepen 2014b).
The classiﬁcatory integration ofmodern or foreign lifestyles into localmodes and prac-
tices illustrates that for residents affected by megaprojects, development is not a binary
choice between modernity and tradition. People are not seeking to replace one mode of
life with another but are hoping to realise both through mutual accommodation. This
aspiration would suggest an inherently different and slower model of change than the
one implicit in megaprojects that seek to replace local livelihoods with more modern
infrastructure and consequently with different social and labour relations.
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Crespi and Guillaud also highlight how local practices adapt to changing circum-
stances in their analysis of strategic identities and the adaptation of ritual practices
in areas affected by the Tasi Mane project in Suai. On the one hand, they show
how the conﬂicts around compensation for land has instigated a revaluation and
strengthening of ritual practices, as these allow local landowners to make claims to
land and, by implication, to funds received as compensation. As residents lose
access to some of their land, those rituals that reafﬁrm connections with ancestors
and certain sites in the landscapes are strengthened. On the other hand, they show
how rituals are creatively adapted to accommodate changing circumstances.
However, megaprojects have an impact not just at the level of ritual practice and
symbolic classiﬁcation. Subtle changes take place in the very fabric of everyday life
and perception. Attentive to the ways in which residents of Timor-Leste’s south
coast connect senses and identity, Prash Naidu (this special issue) explores the place
of sensory experience in people’s responses to new political and economic inﬂuences
in their lives and landscapes. Focusing on the olfactory changes instigated by the con-
struction of a power plant in Betano, Naidu shows how new infrastructure disrupts the
familiar smells of the sea; how new vehicle sounds and fumes evidence the invisible
presence of foreign workers; and how new planning documents and land uses re-envi-
sion the land- and seascapes. This analysis illustrates that changes initiated by mega-
projects are not always directly visible, yet such projects can have subtle disruptive
effects even in the earliest stages of implementation.
Conclusion
While the government focuses on megaprojects as economic instruments, affected
communities and nearby residents experience a wide range of non-economic effects
from living near these projects. Meitzner Yoder stresses how the emphasis on techno-
logical and processual detail in the implementation of ZEESM obscures some of the
underlying political dynamics, whilst Bovensiepen and Nygaard-Christensen show
how the Tasi Mane projects, as a key technology of state building, bring some of
the contradictions of the assertion of sovereignty to the fore. Crespi and Guillaud
detail the impact of spatial access and on adapting customary/ritual practice. Rose
describes how elders express changing expectations or aspirations for their children’s
future livelihoods in ways and terms that ground these steps in landed spiritual reali-
ties. Naidu focuses on the interrelationship of sensory stability and identity and notes
the array of ways in which residents perceive change and also describe their losses and
feared outcomes in sensory terms.
Importantly, though, the articles in this special issue demonstrate that there is no
simple ‘substitution’ of old ways with new ways with the coming of megaprojects.
Rather, people desire to hold on to ‘old ways’ and their existing categories to make
sense of new people, infrastructure, processes and opportunities. There is an infolding,
an accommodation, that does not erase or supplant the pre-existing beliefs or forms of
interacting with the land.
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Encounters with foreign things—educational systems, sounds and smells, material
goods—are not novel. Trade has been going on a long time throughout Timor; cash
crops are not new; the market is not new on their cultural horizon, and markets do
not destroy any imagined, pristine cultural stasis. But as people make sense of and
incorporate new things into their life, Rose (this special issue) reminds us that the
megaproject drivers would do well to acknowledge that ‘people have their own ways
of embracing, and rejecting, powerful outsiders’. At the same time, as Tania Li’s
research in Sulawesi illustrates, residents might not fully anticipate the consequences
of the changes they are seeking to accommodate. Such consequences can include the
destruction of natural resources, radical changes of livelihoods, loss of personal auton-
omy through wage labour, insecurity due to loss of land, as well as growing inequality
and transformation of gender relations.
These articles demonstrate that megaprojects are part of a development model that
can signiﬁcantly disrupt people’s relationships with the land and with others in the
community. Government leaders in ZEESM have consistently and pointedly empha-
sised that the project is intended to be a model and a laboratory on economic, legal and
policy fronts for the nation, and that innovations which prove successful in Oecusse
can be replicated elsewhere in the nation. This could mean that some of the tensions
generated by this development model could also be rolled out nationally. Construction
projects and land expropriation have produced new conﬂicts or brought former con-
ﬂicts into relief. As latent conﬂict is brought to the surface, people are forced into arti-
ﬁcially simpliﬁed ownership categories that are not congruent to those they currently
have; compensation forces people to take positions on norms like shared use-rights. As
land is turned into a ﬁnancial resource, local residents feel major impacts on their
relationship with land, both changing existing relationships and ﬁxing them in
time, and eroding the inherent ﬂexibility of existing techniques of making land claims.
National history gives evidence of the East Timorese people’s commitment and extra-
ordinary capacity to self-organise and to effect socio-political change on amassive scale.
Grassroots political organisation and strong community participation could be con-
sidered East Timorese traditions. While these practices are not often considered part
of ‘custom’ (which is often unduly restricted to ritual realms), the articles in this
special issue demonstrate that there is much space for development models beyond
the artiﬁcial divide of hypermodernist/traditionalist. Overcoming this binary will
move the public debate on Timor-Leste’s development trajectory forward.
Funding
Judith Bovensiepen’s research was supported by Economic and Social Research Council [grant
number ES/L010232/1].
Notes
[1] The enclave’s name has many variations, including Oecusse, Oé-Cusse, and Oecussi; all are
found in this issue, sometimes with -Ambeno added.
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[2] Parliament accepted the draft plan of the 8th Constitutional Government on 27 July 2018. With
regards to the Tasi Mane project, it proposes that the government ‘will participate in the ﬁnan-
cing of some of these projects, as well as the basic infrastructure, such as the airport and the Suai
logistics base. The remaining Tasi Mane projects will be built and developed on a project
ﬁnance basis and other forms of private investment or mixed investment’ (RDTL 2018; unof-
ﬁcial translation La’o Hamutuk). Since 2013, the ZEESM formula outlined that the ﬁrst third of
spending would be state funded, and the remaining two thirds would come later from business
investors; however, proposed modiﬁcations characterise that expectation as unrealistic or ill-
suited to the enclave’s situation (UNDP 2017; World Bank 2016). The 8th Constitutional Gov-
ernment plan indicates that ZEESM and RAEOA will be separated, and that the central govern-
ment will tighten ﬁscal, governance, administrative and procurement aspects in the region and
project (RDTL 2018; unofﬁcial translation La’o Hamutuk).
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